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Abstract 
The sovereign debt crisis in the Eurozone has caused a fundamental shift in the EU’s internal  
power balance with Germany, the strongest political and economic player, essentially 
determining the political response to the crisis. The establishment and implementation of 
more efficient mechanisms to ensure fiscal responsibility amongst the eurozone members and 
the aspiring ones led to the emergence of complex differentiated multiple cores of integration, 
i.e. the Euro-17, Euro Plus and a detached periphery. The CEE countries are represented in 
all three of the emerging cores. This puts them at the heart of the emerging political division 
of the EU, thus generating several challenges and opportunities to their broadly understood 
political and economic security. The objective of this chapter is to explore these issues.  
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1. The emerging EU of multiple cores 
 
The 2007-08 global financial crisis, which has its origins in the sub-prime mortgage turmoil 
in the United States, has severely affected economies across Europe and substantially altered 
the EU’s internal power balance. By 2009 all EU-27 countries, with the exception of Poland, 
were in deep recession. While some recovered relatively quickly, others who already had 
existing problems with structural debt, were plunged into a severe sovereign debt crisis. For 
many countries in Europe the fragile foundations of the financial services industry, which 
over the years prior to the crisis had increasingly operated on a cross-border basis, turned out 
to be the weak spot. The crisis revealed an essential  weakness in the project of monetary 
integration. This was the failure of Euro member states to stick to the rules they had jointly 
had determined for the project of monetary union. The Eurozone essentially was run by a 
governance light approach with no penalties for countries who had built up an excessive 
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deficit being implemented in practice.  The result was a predictable high level of vulnerability 
towards external shocks such as the global financial crisis
1
. 
 
The political response to the crisis in the EU, predominantly determined by Germany, has 
created a new complex policy framework with multiple layers of responsibility. It essentially 
divides the EU membership base into multiple cores with noticeable differences in terms of  
the level of integration and influence. This follows a long-standing discussion in the EU 
about the possibility of differentiated speeds of integration in the EU which became most 
prominent in the early 1990s. The joint paper published by the senior German Christian 
Democrats Wolfgang Schäuble and Karl Lamers on the future of European politics in 1994 
tried to overcome a political stalemate in the enlarging EU by advocating the flexibilisation 
of the integration process. The paper also proposed to allow the deepening of political 
integration amongst a core group of countries who would be willing towards a federal union 
which would be spearheaded by France and Germany
2
. With ongoing enlargement of the EU 
to eventually the current 27 member states the notion that groups of member states may 
deepen their integration at different speed frequently emerged. Since the flexibilisation of the 
decision-making in the EU under the 1998 Amsterdam Treaty, which  introduced the 
possibility for member states to opt out of policy areas, the academic debate has increasingly 
concentrated on an ‘insider’ vs. ‘outsider’ categorisation, based on different levels of 
horizontal (deepening) and vertical (widening) integration in the EU
3
. When considering this 
distinction it becomes obvious that since its creation the European project has never 
completely grounded to a halt. Even during periods where the vertical axis of integration 
(deepening) slowed down or came to a halt, the membership base still grew (widening)
4
. 
Since Maastricht the EU has seen an increasing level of ‘internal differentiation’ between 
groups of members who participate in different forms of integration, with the division into 
the Eurozone group, the associated countries of the European Economic Area (EEA) and the 
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temporary exclusion of the CEE countries from freedom of movement in the Single Market. 
With economic and monetary union as the core project of the EU, the highest level of 
horizontal internal integration has developed inside the Euro group
5
. In response to the 
sovereign debt crisis member states have however initiated a much more pronounced internal 
differentiation of the Single Market, both in horizontal and vertical terms. The horizontal 
division, which used to concentrate on the Eurozone core vs. periphery dichotomy, has now 
been enhanced by the emergence of the additional layer of the Euro Plus group and the 
intergovernmental Fiscal Compact. These three cores are also significantly distinguished by 
their level of vertical integration:  
 
1. The eurozone core is in the process of moving towards gradual political union. This 
process is lead by an increasingly uneven Franco-German alliance. With France’s political 
influence waning as a result of its weakening economy
6
, Germany has moved into the 
position of ‘reluctant hegemon’ in and is consequently substantially shaping the future design 
of the Euro group
7
. The Eurozone has already moved beyond a loose coordinative approach 
by introducing automatic penalties for countries who either fail to correct their excessive 
deficit or display profound macro-economic imbalances
8
. The intergovernmental Fiscal 
Compact, which has 25 signatories (excluding the Czech Republic and the UK), also only 
foresees consequences for a breach of the ‘golden’ fiscal rule for the Euro-17 countries 9. To 
support these new mechanisms the European Commission is developing into an executive 
regulatory body with binding direct supervisory powers over national fiscal and 
macroeconomic policies in the Euro group. Whatever concrete shape the plans for political 
union will eventually take in the Eurozone, the Commission is likely to be equipped with 
substantially more supervisory powers over national policies. Under the latest German plans 
the Commission could be transformed into a fully fledged European executive.  
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The now German finance minister Schäuble has called for the creation of a directly elected 
European president who would lead a Commission with stronger regulatory powers.
10
. The 
Barroso Commission itself envisages the ‘possibility to require a revision of national budgets 
in line with European commitments’11. The practical implementation of these plans will have 
a profound impact on scope for national fiscal and economic policy-making.  
 
2. The Euro Plus Pact group  of countries who voluntarily adhere to the Eurozone SGP 
criteria goes back to the 2011 initiative by Angela Merkel and the former French President 
Sarkozy. The purpose of the Euro Plus Pact is to ensure that the Eurozone countries and 
prospective members commit themselves to deeper policy coordination beyond the Europe 
2020 targets. The aim of the EPP is to encourage the Eurozone-17 countries and the 
participating outsiders Bulgaria, Denmark, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Romania to pursue 
national reform targets which will prepare their economies for a smooth entry into the Euro 
group. Member state governments initially set their own targets. These are subsequently 
monitored by  all EPP members on the basis of annual Commission progress reports
12
.  The 
countries in this group are all relatively committed to engaging in the coordination of their 
policies with the Euro zone. Poland is however the only country in the EPP which has clear 
political reasons for engaging in this process. The Polish government under Donald Tusk 
considers adoption of the Euro as a means to boost their country’s influence in the EU. In 
contrast the other  outsiders, with the exception of Lithuania, are predominantly interested in 
joining the Eurozone for reasons of economic stability and are less positive about the 
potential political benefits than Poland. 
 
3. The third small periphery group of the two countries who prefer to limit themselves to the 
open method of coordination under the European Semester currently consists of the UK and 
the Czech Republic. These two were clearly alienated by the swift Franco-German drive 
towards the deepening of political integration in response to the sovereign debt crisis. A 
major factor in the decision of British Prime minister David Cameron to promise a public 
referendum on EU membership in 2017 is the British scepticism towards the emerging plans 
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for the deepening of political integration in the EU. There is a realistic and to date 
unprecedented prospect that with the UK one of the leading Member states could leave the 
EU within the next five years. A similar sentiment can be found across the political spectrum 
in the Czech Republic Although Euroscepticism in the Czech Republic is far less deep-seated 
than in the United Kingdom
13
, at least for now the Czechs have joined the British in 
positioning themselves on the outer fringes of the EU. The Czech Republic under its current 
leadership seems less concerned about being on the margins of an EU of multiple cores as a 
result of having opted out from the Fiscal Compact.  This periphery group is likely to be 
joined by other Eurozone outsiders who remain only half-heartedly committed to policy 
coordination with the Euro-17. Prime examples for this are Hungary and Sweden, who are 
both signatories of the Fiscal Compact but decided not to participate in the Euro Plus Pact. 
Even some of the Euro-17 countries could join the fringe group in the future if  concerns 
about the impact of political union on national sovereignty increase. Eurosceptic sentiments 
and domestic opposition against the plans for political union in the Eurozone are already 
growing substantially. The latest Eurobarometer results show a sharp decline in public trust in 
the EU across member states. 57 per cent of citizens in the EU-27 now say that they tend not 
to trust the EU, a sharp increase from 37 per cent in 2007
14
. 
Figure 1: The EU’s post-crisis multiple cores 
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Figure 1 illustrates the current differentiation of the EU membership into multiple groups. 
The vertical axis shows the gradual  progression of the level of integration from the relatively 
loose Single Market towards the greater level of coordination under the Fiscal Compact, the 
Euro Plus Group. The highest level of vertical integration takes place in the Euro zone, where 
national governments are obliged to abide by the budgetary and macroeconomic guidance of 
the Commission and where the institutional setup is significantly shaped by Germany and to a 
lesser extent by France. This division is most likely going to be only temporary and could in 
the future either be replaced by a further fragmentation or by greater unity. The latter scenario 
is possible if the UK decides to leave the EU and the remaining nine outsiders (plus the new 
member Croatia) join political union in the Euro group. Given the past experience of how 
member states tend to guard their national sovereignty the more likely scenario is one of 
continuing fragmentation. The emergence of a smaller fully politically integrated Eurozone 
core and a larger periphery of countries who either were pushed out of the Eurozone or 
decide to never join in the first place is a realistic possibility if the crisis symptoms continue.  
 
2. The CEE countries in the EU of multiple cores 
 
The emerging division in the  EU particularly affects the CEE region. The group of countries 
who were the most recent ones to join the EU in 2004 and 2007 have all been facing similar 
challenges in transforming their economies after the end of the Cold War. They are however 
far from being one uniform group and are characterised by distinct political, economic and 
social differences. Following accession all CEE members have made substantial efforts to 
meet the budgetary criteria of the EMU Stability and Growth Pact with a clear aspiration to 
be prepared for Euro entry. The Euro group was however reluctant to apply new applicants 
the same flexibility on the SGP criteria as was shown inside the club.  Countries such as 
Poland who had a clear aspiration to join quickly, were told that they had to meet all the SGP 
criteria, including on the conversion of long-term interest rates. At the same time many 
amongst the then Eurozone-14 members broke the SGP budgetary criteria. It took until 2007 
for Slovenia to become first of the CEE-8 group to join the Euro, Slovakia followed in 2009 
and Estonia in 2011. The others were kept waiting in line. This included Poland which before 
the crisis had set itself an ambition to join by 2012. As Euro members Estonia, Slovakia and 
Slovenia are already participating on all levels of EU decision-making, whilst Poland, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Romania and Bulgaria are in the Euro Plus Group of aspiring member states with a 
rather limited  influence over strategic decisions on the future of the Eurozone. Hungary and 
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the Czech Republic have chosen to remain semi-detached from the core decision-making in 
the EU and are positioned at the outer fringes of the Single Market. 
 
2.1. The Eurozone insiders 
 
In spite of being in the Euro-17 group as small countries the ability of Estonia, Slovakia and 
Slovenia to influence the EU’s policy agenda remains limited. Moreover the three countries 
have been predominantly focused on their domestic affairs and shown little interest in trying 
to make their mark on the wider EU’s internal institutional development. For these smaller 
countries membership of the EU is still predominantly an issue of political and economic 
security. From the perspective of these countries being positioned inside the EU is considered 
to be a crucial safeguard of national independence and adverse external influences, 
predominantly from former regional hegemon Russia. The three CEE Euro members have 
consequently been content with remaining mainly in the position of policy-takers and to 
present themselves as conformist member states.  
 
Slovenia is currently struggling to maintain the latter position as it faces a profound economic 
crisis and is likely to join the list of sovereign debt crisis countries in due course. It faced a 
double-dip recession in 2012 and is predicted to stay in recession at least until 2014. Slovenia 
has been breaking the Maastricht criteria since the financial crisis and its budgetary position 
remains difficult. The country is expected to have to borrow more than five per cent of its 
GDP in 2013 and only slightly less in 2014. At the same time it is also on the brink of 
exceeding the 60 per cent limit of structural debt
15
. Given the difficulty of its economic 
circumstances it is widely expected that Slovenia will be the next Eurozone country to ask for 
financial support under the European Stability Mechanism. Estonia’s relatively open and 
export-orientated economy was also hit hard by the crisis and the country plunged into deep 
recession in 2009. By 2010 the Estonia was however already growing again by more than 
three per cent, followed by a substantial boost to growth in 2001 (8.3 per cent). Since 2012 
growth has slowed down again but is expected to remain between three and four per cent in 
2013 and 2014. The budgetary situation of Estonia remains exemplary with the level of 
annual borrowing below one per cent and a structural deficit of less than 11 per cent
16
. 
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Slovakia  shows an equally good level of recovery from the crisis and since 2010 has returned 
to GDP growth between two and four per cent since. This year Slovakian growth is expected 
to slow down to just above one per cent, with a further upswing expected for 2014. The 
Slovakian budgetary situation is less fortunate. After having exceeded the three per cent 
borrowing limit, the Social Democratic government led by Robert Fico will have to make 
some efforts to meet the SGP annual borrowing target again in 2013 and 2014. Fico 
emphasised that his government will make substantial consolidation efforts to set Slovakia on 
a course of long-term budgetary solidity and to support the EU in its effort ‘to regain the trust 
of markets and the trust of citizens’17. This consolidation course will be essential to prevent 
Slovakia from breaking the second Maastricht criteria, as its level of structural debt has risen 
from 35 per cent in 2009 to 52.4 in 2012
18
. Another big challenge for the Slovakian 
government is the high level of unemployment, which currently stands at 14 per cent  and the 
significant number of 15-24 year old Slovakians who are out of work (35 per cent)
19
. 
 
2.2. The Euro Plus Pact Group 
 
Poland’s chances to join the Euro were dampened by the decline in its budgetary position 
when the global financial crisis hit Europe. Even outside the Eurozone  Poland is the leading 
country amongst the CEE member states and has substantially enhanced its influence in the 
EU since accession in 2004 by playing a largely constructive role. The Tusk government 
worked closely with France and Germany in the Weimar Triangle and was instrumental in the 
development of key strategic policy areas, such as the Eastern partnership under the EU 
neighbourhood policy and also the 2002 Berlin Plus Agreement, which set the framework for 
the for future transatlantic security cooperation between NATO and the EU. Poland also has a 
sound record of economic transformation. Before the financial crisis hit, Poland was on 
course to meet the Maastricht criteria and had brought down its annual level of borrowing to 
1.9 per cent in 2007. Eurozone entry in 2012 was therefore a realistic target but this ambition 
was shattered when the Polish annual deficit broke the three per cent limit again after 2008. 
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The Commission forecasts that Poland could just meet the three per cent SGP three per cent 
annual borrowing limit in 2014 while its structural level of debt is likely to remain below the 
60 per cent limit.
20
 The Polish government has clear leadership ambitions in the EU and is 
frank in expressing these. At the same time there is a realisation that entry into the Eurozone 
will be a crucial factor in ensuring that Poland will eventually be able to match the political 
and economic weight of France and Germany. The Polish foreign minister Sikorski considers 
the current crisis as an opportunity for Poland to enhance its influence, particularly in the 
light of the increasing isolation of the UK under David Cameron: 
 
 In light of the turmoil in the south and the insular British approach, we stand a chance 
 of becoming part of the hard core of European decision-makers. Even though we are 
 already a Member-State to be reckoned with, to further boost our  significance we  
 should be ready to adopt the euro
21
. 
 
Under the conditions of the sovereign debt crisis adopting the Euro has become a 
controversial domestic issue in Poland. The Polish prime minister Donald Tusk highlighted 
this in his recent public discussions with Angela Merkel in Berlin when he spoke of the 
possibility of holding a public referendum before setting another date for Eurozone entry
22
. 
Poland is currently the only country amongst the CEE-10 which has started to move into the 
position of active policy-maker
23
.  
 
The other EPP signatories have so far remained in the position of passive policy-takers and 
also sent mixed signals regarding their interests in joining the Euro. Latvia has set itself 
January 2014 as the national target for Euro adoption while Lithuania is still in the process of 
determining an official target date for accession. While Lithuania officially remains 
committed towards Euro entry, the level of enthusiasm for joining the Eurozone under the 
current crisis conditions amongst Lithuanians remains low. The latest Eurobarometer on the 
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issue conducted in April 2012 shows that 51 per cent of citizens in Lithuania are against 
joining the euro. Even more are opposed in Latvia (53 per cent) and Poland (54 per cent), 
which reflects the overall growing public scepticism about the current state of Eurozone. In 
spite of this the majority of citizens in all the CEE outsiders, apart from the Czech Republic 
consider, the euro as having had positive effects on those countries who introduced it (47 per 
cent in Lithuania)
 24
. As a relatively open economy with a sluggish domestic sector Lithuania 
is more sceptical than its neighbours about being tied into a Eurozone framework which has 
essentially now become a transfer union
25
. The political benefits of joining are less clear cut 
for Lithuania than they are for Poland. It is therefore likely that Lithuania will remain 
lukewarm about joining in the near future. 
 
Bulgaria and Romania show the greatest level of passivity in the CEE group. The still two 
newest members are currently content with remaining in a position of policy-takers and to 
overcome any prejudices towards their ability to fully integrate the EU’s acquis, including the 
Schengen area. This is the inevitable consequence of the fact that both countries remain 
substantially behind other CEE members when it comes to the efficiency of domestic 
governance and regulatory quality. There are therefore justified doubts about the 
implementation of the rule of law and reduction of the levels of corruption in both 
countries
26
.  In addition the emerging debate in the UK, Germany and other member states on 
the expected negative effects of the end of the transitional periods for the free movement of 
people from Bulgaria and Romania in 2014 illustrates that both countries are still essentially 
regarded as outsiders by their Western European counterparts. Romania has nevertheless 
submitted an official application to join the Eurozone by 2015, which is based on having met 
the budgetary criteria for entry in 2012 with especially low levels of public debt (38 per cent 
in relation to the GDP)
27
.  Bulgaria has similar sound budgetary figures with extremely low 
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structural debt of around 18 per cent
28
. Both countries still face profound challenges when it 
comes to their social cohesion. They have the largest number of citizens in the EU-27 who 
are considered to be at risk of poverty. In Romania currently 40 per cent of all citizens are 
considered to be at risk of poverty or social exclusion, in Bulgaria the figure even stands at 
almost 50 per cent (against the EU-27 average of around 24 per cent)
29
. This is the 
background to the increasing concerns amongst some of the EU-15 countries that they may 
be facing substantial levels of poverty migration when the transitional restrictions on the free 
movement of Bulgarians and Romanians end in 2014
30
. 
 
2.3. The periphery group 
 
The Czech Republic and Hungary have clearly chosen to remain on the sidelines when it 
comes to strategic decision-making in the EU and are concentrating on their domestic affairs.  
In the case of Hungary this is the result of persistent economic weakness with low levels of 
growth, high unemployment and consequently difficulties in consolidating the country’s 
budget. Hungary’s structural level of debt has slightly decreased from the peak of over 80 per 
cent in relation to its GDP in 2010 and 2011 but is forecast to remain in the high 70s until 
2014. Hungary was in recession in 2012 and is likely to remain in it until 2014 when the 
Commission forecasts slight growth of 1.3 per cent. Unemployment has risen to over 10 per 
cent in 2012 and is likely to grow beyond 11 per cent until 2014, which is higher than the 
EU-27 average
31
. Hungary fares particularly badly when it comes to youth unemployment 
amongst 15 to 24 year olds, which currently stands at 29 per cent
32
. The European Working 
Conditions Observatory estimates that between 2004 and 2010 approximately 27,000 
Hungarians have left the country each year to work abroad and in 2011 the number of 
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Hungarians emigrating to work abroad rose to 85,000
33
. The government of prime minister 
Victor Orban has made economic and budgetary consolidation a priority of its domestic 
agenda and imposed a strict austerity course. Orban has also implemented a controversial 
programme of domestic constitutional reforms which has been widely criticised by the EU 
and other member state governments. The response from the Hungarian government has been 
one of playing towards Eurosceptic and even nationalist sentiments at home. Orban is not 
afraid to compare the EU with the Soviet Union under Stalin and to promote an isolationist 
stance in the domestic political debate:  
 
 We are building a country in which people don’t work for the profit of foreigners. A 
 country in which we will not be told how to live our lives, what can be in our 
 Constitution and when we can increase wages, by bankers and foreign bureaucrats. A 
 country in which no-one can force the interests of others upon the Hungarian 
 people.’34  
 
This inward-looking stance, which is accompanied by a tax levy on foreign companies, is 
likely to isolate Hungary politically in the long run. It also threatens to deter foreign 
companies from investing in the country and to undermine the country’s foundations for 
economic recovery. Given its current focus on domestic issues, the Hungarian government is 
unlikely to pursue Eurozone entry in the foreseeable future.  Even if Hungary should 
eventually meet the SGP criteria, the Orban government is likely to remain sceptical of the 
emerging political architecture in the Eurozone. Hungarian concerns regarding Euro 
membership are likely to focus on the potential impact on the country’s budgetary 
sovereignty and general political autonomy
35
. 
 
The Czech Republic is in much better economic shape but has nevertheless chosen to opt out  
of the Euro Plus Pact and the Fiscal Compact. The Czechs also have become very sceptical 
about the benefits of joining the euro. This is the result of a domestic political debate which 
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was strongly influenced by the former Czech president Václav Klaus, who is an ardent 
Eurosceptic. The Czech Republic was in recession in 2012 and is forecast to have zero 
growth this year. The country nonetheless has relatively low levels of unemployment  
(between 6.7 and 7 per cent in 2011-12) when compared with the EU-27 average of over 10 
per cent. It is forecast to meet the SGP annual borrowing limit of three per cent again in 2014 
and has structural debt below 50 per cent
36
. The Czech government continues to adopt a 
cautious approach and avoids to make an official commitment to Eurozone entry. Prime 
ministers Nĕcas’s decision to join the UK in opting out of the Fiscal Compact  has  domestic 
predominantly domestic reasons and could be reversed after the 2014 general election. Nĕcas 
justified the Czech position by pointing out that his government would not want to act as 
hurdle towards deeper integration in the EU. At the same time he emphasised that his 
government would resist pressures to sign up to the greater harmonisation in policy areas 
other than the liberalisation of the Single Market
37
. A crucial factor in determining the future 
Czech stance towards Eurozone membership and political union will be the role of the new 
Czech president Miloŝ Zeman, who seems to have a far more constructive attitude towards 
the EU than his predecessor.  
 
3. Risks and opportunities for the CEEs 
 
The currently emerging division poses risks and opportunities for the CEEs. One major risk is 
that it may drive them further apart and undermine any efforts to make a concerted effort to 
influence the EU policy agenda. The profound effect the Eurozone crisis had on the region 
shows how closely interlinked all CEE economies have become with the rest of the Single 
Market. Even those countries who currently are outside the Eurozone continue to be 
profoundly affected by the crisis as a result of their dependence on  exports to the Euro-17 
countries
38
. For reasons of their own economic security the CEE Eurozone outsiders therefore 
have a substantial interests in ensuring  that the Eurozone recovers from its current economic 
woes. At the same time, under the EU’s emerging multi-tier system of members, the CEE 
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outsiders (even those in the Euro Plus group) have only very limited influence over the 
emerging architecture of political union in the Eurozone. Given the declining level of public 
support for adoption of the Euro in all CEE outsiders, with the exception of Bulgaria, 
Romania and Hungary
39
, the emergence of multiple cores hence may establish an insider-
outsider dichotomy in the CEE group with those countries outside the Euro group 
increasingly losing interest in joining and consequently becoming more detached from the 
political process in the Eurozone core. 
 
There are however also reasons to be more optimistic about the future scenario. All CEE 
countries maintain high levels of public support for the deepening of political cooperation in 
response to the financial and economic crisis. Between 88 and 92 per cent of the population 
in all CEE-10 countries totally agree that EU member states should work together more to 
tackle the crisis. A majority of citizens in Poland (53 per cent), Slovakia (52 per cent), Latvia 
(46 per cent), and surprisingly even in the Czech Republic (55 per cent), even support moves 
towards developing the EU into a federation. None of the CEE countries show the levels of 
Euroscepticism which can be found in the UK, where a clear and growing majority of the 
population opposes a federal union for the EU (54 per cent).
40
 
 
The level of influence from Central and Eastern Europe will to a large extent depend on 
Poland’s willingness  to continue working closely with the other CEE countries in finding 
common positions on major EU policy issues. In this respect deeper and sustained 
cooperation amongst the Visegrád  4 countries (Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and 
Hungary) will be crucial for raising the profile of the region in the current EU debate. The V4 
countries are in the process of deepening their cooperation and have just announced their 
intention to create a joint battlegroup of 2,5000 soldiers in an effort to boost the EU’s military 
capabilities and to ‘instil a habit of permanent cooperation’41 in this area. It seems that the 
Tusk government in Warsaw is willing to achieve a leading role in the EU as part of the V4 
cooperation rather than to go it alone. Poland is currently the only CEE country who has 
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already to a certain extent contributed to shaping the EU policy process, particularly when it 
held the presidency of the EU at the peak of the crisis in the second half of 2011. The Tusk 
government has made efforts to move the current narrow EU agenda beyond the management 
of the Eurozone crisis and emphasised the need to refocus on neglected policy areas, such as 
defence and security
42
. The Polish government also called on Germany to adopt a more active 
role in shaping the future of the EU beyond the sovereign debt crisis. Polish foreign minister 
Sikorski emphasised that he would be more concerned by German inactivity than by 
Germany essentially taking the lead in shaping the future of the EU
43
. The presidency yet also 
showed that as an outsider the Polish government remains a marginal player when it comes to 
determining the new institutional architecture for the core Euro group
44
. 
 
 
As a unified group led by Poland the V4 would potentially have huge potential to make their 
voices heard in Brussels. All four countries have close economic and political ties with 
Germany and are therefore more relaxed about Germany leading the EU than some of their 
EU-15 counterparts (including France and the UK)
45
. The current split of the V4 group into 
one member in the core Euro-17 group (Slovakia), one aspiring member in the Euro Plus 
group (Poland) and two relative outsiders (Hungary and the Czech Republic) will however 
make it harder for these countries to coordinate their strategic interests in the EU. Moreover 
in the EU the V4 cooperation has no formal status and therefore currently receives little 
attention
46
. It will therefore be crucial for the V4 countries to raise the profile of their 
cooperation by presenting common positions on major European strategic issues and to 
institutionalise their cooperation further. 
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In the absence of a visionary approach and a lack of engagement on the part of the ‘old’ EU-
15 countries the CEE countries have a much needed contribution to make to ensure that the 
EU recovers not just economically but also politically from the crisis. They could help the EU 
to achieve a broad and lasting political consensus on the future design of Single Market, other 
strategic EU policy areas such as defence and external relations and to a certain extent even 
the shape of the Eurozone. In this context the joint proposals the V4 prime ministers made in 
June 2012, which included demands to make EU cohesion funds available more flexibly in 
order to assist member-states with their domestic challenges and to develop new innovative 
instruments to stimulate growth
47
, show that at least some of the CEE countries are strong 
advocates of maintaining cohesion and solidarity in the EU under crisis conditions.  
 
While the risk of the present setup for the CEEs are obvious, the volatility of the situation  
could also be an opportunity for these countries to help the EU from drifting further apart. 
The varying levels of enthusiasm amongst the CEE countries and especially within the V4 
group for the German ambition to create deeper political union in Eurozone and ultimately 
for the whole of the EU is a micro reflection of the bigger EU-27 picture
48
. The Polish and 
Slovak support for deeper political union is likely to be counterbalanced by other CEE 
countries, especially the Czech Republic and Hungary, who are adamant to safeguard their 
sovereignty after decades of external political domination by the Soviet Union. This could be 
the foundation for a healthy balance between deepening integration and maintaining national 
diversity. Such a new vision for the future of the EU in times of crisis and would help to 
regain the purpose of the European project and to reconnect it with its citizens. In the long 
run the countries who were once petitioners for accession into the EU club may still turn out 
to be its saviours. 
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